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I. Introduction
The 2008 worldwide financial crisis entered developing
countries in the form of a currency crisis. The sudden cutback in
lending by banks going through a credit crunch heightened the
default risk of developing countries that relied on foreign debt to
provide short-term financing and to sustain domestic growth. In
2008, it was estimated that net private capital inflows to emerging
markets was US$619 billion, down almost one-third from the 2007
level.1 More than US$20 billion flowed out of emerging market
equities in the third quarter of 2008.2 As foreign investors fled
emerging markets, they converted assets held in local currencies
into assets denominated in more "secure" currencies, such as the
U.S. Dollar, Euro and Japanese Yen.3 This pullback exacerbated
pressure on local currencies that were already weakened by
soaring inflation as a result of years of over-exuberance in
emerging market investment.4 The macro-economic environment
in emerging markets was similar to that of Asian countries
immediately before the outbreak of the Asian currency crisis just a
decade ago. In September and October of 2008, the world
witnessed massive moves in every major currency, and in some
not so major ones, which economists interpreted as a prelude to a
new episode of currency crisis of a severity unmatched by any
previous crisis.'
I See Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies, INST. INT'L FIN., Oct. 12,
2008, at 1, http://miha.ef.uni-
lj.si/_dokumenti3plus2/191241/EMERGINGMARKETS.pdf.
2 See id. at 3.
3 See, e.g., Mark Landler & Vikas Bajaj, Some Currencies Plunge as Stocks Sink
Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2008, at Al.
4 On November 3, 2008, the Korean Won was 35% weaker against the U.S. Dollar
than the exchange rate at the beginning of 2008. On October 29, 2008, the exchange rate
between the Euro and the Hungarian Forint reached 1-284 from the rate of 1-230 in late
July of 2008. On October 26, 2008, Ukraine currency fell to its historical low against the
dollar at 6.01-1. See generally Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com/currency-
converter (allowing the conversion of currencies on the given dates).
5 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, The Conscience of a Liberal: The mother of all
currency crises, N.Y. TIMEs BLOG, http://krugnan.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/26/the-
mother-of-all-currency-crises (Oct. 26, 2008, 10:37 EST)
(I've been reading reports from Stephen Jen, a former student of mine who's
now the chief currency strategist at Morgan Stanley. He points out that since
the fall of Lehman, we've been seeing clear signs of currency crises throughout
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Some developing countries going through the crisis have
established a currency board system,6 whereby the local currency
is pegged to a more stable currency - typically the U.S. Dollar or
the Euro - or a composite of currencies in order to maintain the
stability of the local currency.7 One salient feature of the currency
board is that domestic interest rates adjust automatically to
pressures on the local currency. In late October 2008, Hungary
raised its base interest rate by 3.0% to 11.5% (the highest increase
since 2003) as a defensive move against speculative attacks on its
plunging Forint.8 On November 28, 2008, Russia's central bank
announced its decision to raise key interest rates to stem further
devaluation of the Ruble.9 Interest rate hikes at times of economic
recessions further hinder growth and inflict additional pressure on
the local stock market.10 On the day of their respective interest
rate increases, the Hungarian benchmark stock index BUX was
down 3.4%11 and the Russian 30-Stock Micex Index sank 2.8%.12
This is a perfect setting for manipulators to carry out, on a large
scale, a "double-play manipulation" strategy. They attack the
weakening local currency and simultaneously park large short
positions in the equity market, typically by utilizing the leverage
effect of the index futures product, in anticipation of the negative
the world of emerging markets, including Eastern Europe. This time, it's not an
Asian crisis or a Latin American crisis, it's a global crisis.).
6 See generally Mart S6rg & Vello Vensel, Development of the Banking System
Under the Estonian Currency Board, 8 INT'L ADVANCES ECON. RES. 35, 35 (2002)
(examining countries such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Hong Kong and Argentina that have
established currency board systems).
7 See id. at 35-36.
8 See Vidya Ram, Hungary Raises Rates To Defend Currency, FORBES, Oct. 22,
2008, 2, available at http://www.forbes.com/2008/10/22/eastern-europe-downturn-
markets-econ-cxvr 1 022markets18.html; Zoltan Simon, Hungary Raises Rates,
Sacrificing Growth to Protect Currency, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 22, 2008, 6,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=ajzKRzwcQxkY.
9 See Emma O'Brien & Maria Levitov, Ruble Collapse Prompts Russia to Raise
Interest Rates (Update]), BLOOMBERG, Nov. 28, 2008, $ 12,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid--newsarchive&sid=aS9UcWrGGfOY.
10 See Jeff Faux, The Next Recession, ECON. POL'Y INST., Mar. 4, 2002, 16-19,
http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/webfeaturesviewpoints-next recession.
11 See Simon, supra note 8.
12 See Maria Levitov, Russian Central Bank Raises Key Rates to Cap Prices
(Update2), BLOOMBERG, Nov. 28, 2008, 7 14,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid-newsarchive&sid=aFLezuUrI6k.
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stock market impact of increased interest rates. Double-play
manipulation was believed to have been carried out a decade ago
during the Asian currency crisis and exacerbated the pain for
Asian countries going through major corrections in their
economies. 3
In order to deter such a manipulative scheme, and to alleviate
the pressures that it inflicted on the local currency and the equity
market, some Asian governments, in particular the Hong Kong
Monetary Authority, took an unprecedented approach by
intervening in both the currency market and the equity market.
"We wish to send the very clear message to those manipulating
our currency for this purpose that they may stand to lose money
instead," said the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary
Authority in explaining the motivation of the intervention to the
Hong Kong public.' 4 During the two-week intervention period
(August 14 to August 28, 1998), the Hong Kong government
bought US$12 billion to US$15 billion (about 15.5% of Hong
Kong's foreign reserves) worth of local stocks and long positions
in the benchmark Hang Seng Index Futures. 5 For the single day
of August 28, 1998, when the August Hang Seng Index Futures
contract was expiring, the government was forced to lay out
approximately US$9 billion.' 6 This action held the Hang Seng
Index to a slight drop of 1.2% on a day when markets around the
world plummeted. "7
The high cost of intervention gives rise to the concern and
criticism that equity market intervention is not sustainable and
thus lacks credibility in the long run as an effective tool in
combating double-play manipulations. "Even with its vast foreign
exchange fund - worth roughly $97 billion - most analysts said
13 See Joseph Yam, Why We Intervened, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 1998, at 6,
available at http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/eng/speeches/speechs/joseph/speech
_200898b.htm ("I have no doubt that there has been manipulation of our currency to
engineer extreme conditions in the interbank market and high interest rates in order to
reap profits from large short positions in stock index futures.").
14 Id.
15 See Mark Landler, Hong Kong Shifts Gears, This Time Trying Reverse, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 1998, at Cl.
16 See G. Bruce Knecht, Hong Kong Intervention Escalates; More Hinted, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 31, 1998, at A8.
17 See id.
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Hong Kong could not afford a run-and-gun battle with traders for
more than a few weeks. And experts are now focusing on how
Hong Kong officials plan to extricate themselves from this
standoff," wrote a commentator in the New York Times shortly
after the Hong Kong intervention. '
In this paper, we seek to address this problem by exploring the
feasibility of increasing temporarily (i.e., during the crisis period)
the transaction cost on short positions in the equity market and
using a transaction levy to sustain the continuation of the
government's intervention. The selective imposition of higher
transaction costs on short positions is justified on the ground that
those who have inflicted the pain on the financial market are
charged with the responsibility of paying for the consequences.
Intervention sustained by the transaction levy also avoids the
criticism that the government squanders its hard-earned tax dollars
on stock market gambling. Moreover, the government's financial
resources are positively linked to the magnitude of the short
pressures in the market-the larger the short volumes, the bigger
the government's coffer to support its market interventions.
Increasing transaction costs to deter undesirable financial
market activities was advocated by Nobel Laureate James Tobin
(and hence called the "Tobin Tax") in 1978. Professor Tobin
calculated that a 0.5% tax (each way) on foreign exchange
transactions would yield more than US$1.5 trillion in annual
revenue and would be a considerable deterrent to persons
contemplating a quick round-trip trade to another currency. 19 The
Tobin Tax was urged for implementation during the Asian
financial crisis,2" and is currently a focal point of discussion again
as the world's emerging economies are experiencing speculative
attacks on their currencies."
18 Landler, supra note 15, at C8.
19 See James Tobin, A Proposal for International Monetary Reform, 4 E. ECON. J.,
153, 153-59 (1978).
20 In 1997, Ignacio Ramonet, the editor-in-chief of the French publication Le
Monde Diplomatique, renewed the debate around the Tobin tax with an editorial titled
"Disarming the Markets". Ramonet proposed to create an association for the
introduction of this tax. See Ignacio Ramonet, Disarming the Markets, LE MONDE
DIPLOMATIQUE, Dec. 1, 1997, 11, available at http://mondediplo.com/1997/12/leader.
21 See, e.g., Paul Rogers, A World in Flux: Crisis to Agency, OPENDEMOCRACY
NEws ANALYSIS, Oct. 16, 2008, at 4, http://www.opendemocracy.net/node/46530/pdf
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An important question associated with extending the Tobin
Tax concept to the stock market is whether such a measure will be
effective in the double-play manipulation setting by forcing
manipulators to reduce short positions in both the currency and
stock markets. The answer to this question is not immediately
apparent given the lack of studies on manipulators' behaviors
when facing such a regulatory measure. Our paper seeks to fill
this void by setting up an optimal portfolio choice problem from
the perspective of a double-play manipulator and examining how
his optimal short positions change when he faces interventions and
higher transaction costs.
This paper proceeds in the following order: Section II sets up a
portfolio choice model as mentioned above and derives the
conditions under which a double-play manipulator reduces short
positions. Section III empirically tests for the existence of the
conditions derived in Section II by studying historical events of
increases in transaction costs at times of financial crisis or
substantial downturns. Section IV states the conclusions of this
study.
II. A Double-Play Manipulator's Portfolio Choice Problem
A. The Model Setup
A double-play manipulator implements a strategy of shorting
the local currency and shorting the futures contract in the index of
the local stock market.22 Let (S,, S, t) be the manipulator's short
positions in the currency and the stock index futures markets. The
manipulator chooses his short positions at time t to maximize his
expected terminal utility at time t+]. His utility function is given
by U =e , where R0 is the risk aversion parameter and
W,, is his terminal wealth at t+1. Let W0 be the manipulator's
(describing the need for some version of the Tobin Tax to curb excesses of currency
speculation).
22 It is more advantageous for the manipulator to short the index futures market due
to the limited upfront capital requirement. In addition, some emerging countries prohibit
short selling in the underlying stock market. See, e.g., ANCHADA CHAROENROOK &
HAZEM DAOUK, FIN. MARKETS RES. CTR., THE WORLD PRICE OF SHORT SELLING, 34, 35
(October 2004), available at httpJ/www.owen.vanderbilt.edu/finrc/papers
%20data/2004%20papers%20pdf/short saleAida.pdf (providing examples of emerging
countries prohibiting short selling).
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initial endowment. The manipulator borrows the local currency at
time t and sells it immediately in the spot currency market for U.S.
dollars, which he then invests at the rate of r,,,.
The government imposes a one-way transaction fee, payable at
times of order execution, of r% on the value of short positions in
the index futures contract. The government intervenes in the
index futures market by taking long positions. Any revenue
generated by trades executed at a given price level is used for
intervention at the same price level. For example, if US$100 is
collected from trades executed at a price level of 900, the
government will use up to US$100 to long contracts at the price
level of 900.
Let r,, be the local-currency interest rate at time t+].
Let r,- r+ (S , (-), Or(')). In words, r,+, is a function of the
manipulator's short positions in the local currency, S,,, (r), and all
other relevant factors captured by the variable Or(r ) . Both of
these variables are influenced by the transaction fee r. The
currency market is deep and thus, under normal market conditions,
positions of any single player have no palpable effects on the
interest rate. However, a panic herding behavior occurs in times
of currency crisis and makes it possible for trades of a single
player to generate a market-wide response.23
Let v1, (r) be the aggregate trading volume (i.e., the number of
index futures contracts traded) during the period of t to t+], after
excluding the volume generated by the government intervention.
Trading volume is influenced by the transaction fee r. Let g, be
the number of index futures contracts that the government buys
during its intervention in the period of t to t+]. The government
intervenes at each traded price level, but the magnitude of its
intervention at each level is limited to the transaction fee collected
from trades executed at that price level. In addition, we assume
that on average the government loses 20% on each trade, with
contracts bought earlier during the period losing more and those
bought toward the end of the period losing less. 24 Under these
23 See, e.g., Ansgar Belke & Ralph Setzer, Contagion, Herding and Exchange-rate
Instability -A Survey, INTERECONOMICS, 222, 225 (2004).
24 This extremely cautious assumption is used in deriving the government's financial
position as a result of its intervention activities in the downward moving futures market.
The government's loss in the market constitutes a financial constraint on its continued
intervention in the market. Given what had happened in Hong Kong in late August 1998
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assumptions, g, = vl, (r)r /(20 - r) (see Appendix A. 1 for
derivation).
Let F, be the price of index futures contract at time t, and
E(F,+) be the manipulator's expected price of the index futures
contract at time t+]. The expected index futures price level is a
function of the interest rate at time t+l that is captured by the
variable rt+(S 5, (r), 0r (r)), the magnitude of the government's
intervention that is captured by the variable g, (r), and all other
factors that are captured by Of (r). These elements are, in turn,
functions of the transaction fee T. Thus
F, l = F[r,+, (S$,, (r), Or (r)), g, (Z-), 0Of (r)]. Note that F, l is not set
as a function of Sf.,, which represents the manipulator's short
positions in the index futures market at time t, due to the depth of
the index futures market and trading restrictions.25
Let F. +lbe the variance of F,+1 and influenced by the
transaction fee r. Thus, 7 .Ft+ -- F2,t,1 (").
B. A Double-Play Manipulator's Optimization of Terminal
Utility
Costs associated with a double-play strategy are as follows:
First, there is the difference in the interest rates for the local
currency and the U.S. Dollar. By shorting the local currency, the
manipulator foregoes the local currency interest that is typically
higher than the interest on an equivalent amount of the U.S.
Dollar. His cost is S$,, (r, - rus,), where r, is the interest rate on
the local currency and rus., is the interest rate on the U.S. Dollar.
Second, the manipulator pays a transaction fee on short
positions in index futures in the amount of VFS,,r%, where V is
the value assigned to one index point by the futures exchange.
The manipulator borrows the entire amount of the cost and pays
(the real life incident of government's futures market intervention to deter double-play
manipulation in financial crisis), an average loss of 20% during the intervention period is
a conservative and worst-case-scenario assumption about the government's financial
loss.
25 For example, Hong Kong Exchange has a 10,000 position delta limit for Hang
Seng Index Futures Contracts, Mini-Hang Seng Index Futures and Mini-Hang Seng
Index Options in all contract months. See HONG KONG EXCHANGE, RULES, REGULATIONS
AND PROCEDURES OF H.K. FUTURES EXCH., CONTRACT SPECIFICATIONS FOR MINI-HANG
SENG CHINA ENTERPRISES INDEX (HSCEI) FUTURES 1 (2009), available at
http://www.hkex.com.hk/rule/dervrule/SIF-CS.pdf.
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back VFtSf ,r%( + r )at time t+].
At time t+], the manipulator unwinds the short positions in
index futures. There is no transaction fee imposed on long
positions, so his transaction cost for the unwinding is zero. His
gain or loss is captured by (F, - F,, )VS,, i.e., the change in the
index futures price multiplied by the value of each index point and
the size of his short positions. The manipulator's terminal wealth
at time t+1 from trading in both the currency market and the index
futures market is
W,+, = (Wo - VFSf,r%)(1 + r,) + (F - F+, )VSf, t - S,, (r, - rus) .
The manipulator has a utility function given by -e
which is expected to have the value at time t+1 equal to
exp {[ R. (Wo - VFS ,r%)(l + r,) + (F, - E(F,+ ))VSf, - S., (i, - rs)]R 2 Z2 2 2 'n "
RS,t t+,). (See Appendix A.2 for derivation). The
manipulator sets his short positions in the currency and the index
futures markets (Sf, S$,, ) at time t to maximize the value of this
expected utility.
C. The Effect of Higher Transaction Fee r on the
Manipulator's Optimal Choice of Short Positions
A double-play manipulator's optimal choice of short positions
in the currency and the index futures markets must satisfy the
conditions given by equations (1) and (2) in Appendix A.2 (the
"first order conditions"). We would like to see how his optimal
choices change in response to an increase in the transaction fee r.
Based on the Implicit Function Theorem,26 we take derivatives
with regard to the transaction fee T on both sides of the first order
conditions and obtain equations (3) and (4) in Appendix A.3 (See
Appendix A.3 for derivation). We prove in Appendix A.4 that an
increase in the transaction fee r results in the manipulator
lowering short positions in both the currency market and the index
futures market if A and B in these equations are both positive.
Components of A are shown in Appendix A.3. The first two
components capture the effect of an increase in the transaction fee
r on the expected price of the index futures contract through the
operation of factors other than the manipulator's currency market
26 The Theorem allows one to take derivatives on an unspecified function with
regard to any of its variables.
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short position and the government's index futures market
intervention. In other words, an increase in the transaction fee
r causes changes in these factors, which in turn causes change in
the index futures price. The third component of A, "EF,) ", is
the change in the index futures price given the increase in the
transaction fee r through the government's intervention. In other
words, an increase in the transaction fee permits the government to
intervene in a bigger magnitude and results in, as experience
suggests, a positive movement in the index futures price if the
higher transaction fee does not desiccate trading volume.27 The
function aor,+1 /ar of the last component captures changes in the
volatility of the index futures price at time t+1 as a result of an
increase in the transaction fee -T. It is straightforward to see that A
is positive if components one, two, three and five (component four
is necessarily positive) are non-negative. That is, A is positive if
the increase in transaction cost does not lead to lower price (not
taking into account the government's intervention and the
manipulator's short positions), lower trading volume and lower
price volatility.
The components of B are also shown in Appendix A.3. The
combination of the first two components captures the price effect
of an increase in the transaction fee r that is attributable to factors
other than the government's intervention. The third component
captures the price effect of changes in the transaction fee that is
attributable to the government's intervention. This component is
positive because an increase in the transaction fee strengthens the
government's intervention, which in turn has a positive impact on
the index futures price. In addition, the factor 8r,+4 /aS,, in this
component is positive, as established by well-recognized financial
market experience," since it reflects how the manipulator's short
positions in the local currency affect the local interest rate. Thus,
if the increase in the transaction fee has a non-negative effect on
the index futures price (not considering the price effect of the
government's intervention and the manipulator's short positions in
the index futures market), B is positive.
In sum, a double-play manipulator will optimize by reducing
short positions in both the currency and the index futures markets
27 See infra pp. 112-13.
28 See supra p. 104 and accompanying notes.
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if the increase in the transaction cost does not result in lower price,
volatility, and volume in the index futures market.
III. Empirical Testing for the Impact of Increasing
Transaction Fee on the Volatility, Price, and Volume of the
Index Futures Market
A. Identification of Events
Since manipulators adjust their trading strategies to the higher
transaction fee r depending on how r affects the index futures
price, volatility, and volume, we proceed to identify events of
increases in transaction costs in the recent past when the market
was subject to substantial and persistent downward pressures, and
analyze the effect of these events on volatility, price, and volume.
Events were identified from news releases covering the period
from January 1, 1991 to December 1, 2008, and were filtered to
exclude those for which data was unavailable 29 and those that
occurred during multiple event periods,3" such that it is difficult to
segregate the effect of the increase in transaction costs from the
effect of other simultaneously occurring events. We also included
events causing increases in transaction costs that occurred in the
stock market rather than the index futures market because the two
markets are closely linked by index arbitrage activities. These
events were also included because the volatility, price, and volume
effects in the underlying stock market are good indicators of what
the effects would have been had the increase occurred in the index
futures market.
29 For example, we have excluded the event on March 15, 2001, when the Bombay
Stock Exchange increased the initial margin on SENSEX futures contracts from 9% to
14%. India's SENSEX stood at 3666.20 on March 15, 2001, a near 20% decline from
the 4372.60 level just a month before. For a description of the event, see Sangita Shah,
BSE Steps up Initial Futures Margin to 14 Percent, Mar. 17, 2001, 1,
http://www.rediff.com/money/2001/mar/17bse.htm.
30 For example, on September 1, 1998, the Hong Kong Futures Exchange imposed
a 150% margin surcharge on position-holders who had accumulated more than 10,000
contracts. Starting from August 31, 1998, the exchange also required members to report
any open account holding 250 contracts or more and identify the beneficial owner of
each reportable position. Previously, the reporting level had been 500 contracts and
position-holders remained anonymous. For discussion of this event, see Bayani Cruz,
Stephen Seawright & Dennis Ng, Short Selling to be Curbed, THE STANDARD, Sept. 1,
1998, 7, available at http://www.thestandard.com.hk/archive-newssearch_
resu.asp?d-str=19980901 &page= 13 (follow "Short-selling to be curbed" hyperlink).
20091
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The following events are included in our sample: (1) Japan:
On January 31, 1991, the Tokyo Stock Exchange raised margins
on index futures contracts from 15% to 20%.31 The Nikkei 225
Index dropped 35% from 32,891 on May 28, 1990 to 23,157 on
January 28, 1991.32 (2) Poland: On December 6, 1994, after the
Warsaw Stock Exchange had been experiencing a downhill slide
for 10 months, Poland announced a 0.2% sales tax to be imposed
on stock market transactions starting January 2, 1995." 3 (3)
Australia: On October 24, 1997 (in the midst of the Asian
financial crisis), the Sydney Futures Exchange raised the initial
margin payable on its Share Price Index Futures Contract from
AU$2,500 to AU$3,000 per contract.34 (4) Hong Kong: On
August 21, 1997, the initial margin on Hang Seng Index Futures
was raised from HK$50,000 to HK$55,000.3 5 (5) Hong Kong: On
September 4, 2007, the initial margin on Hang Seng Index Futures
was increased again from HK$55,000 to HK$60,000.3 6 (6) Hong
Kong: On October 24, 1997, the initial margin on Hang Seng
Index Futures was increased from HK$70,000 to HK$75,000.3 7
(7) Hong Kong: On November 4, 1997, the initial margin on Hang
Seng Index Futures was increased from HK$75,000 to
HK$90,000.38 (8) India: On June 18, 2001, the National Stock
Exchange of India raised existing margins on ALBM 39 from
17.5% to 40%.4' India's SENSEX index stood at 3,353 on June
18, 2001, a decline of 30% since the high of 4,392 on February 5,
31 See Margins on Stock-Index and Options Trading to Rise, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE, Jan. 30, 1991, 2.
32 See Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=^IN225&a=04&b=
28&c= 1990&d=00&e=28&f= 1991&g--d&z=66&y=132 (last visited Oct. 21, 2009).
33 See Finance Minister Says Transaction Tax at WSE a Sure Thing, PAP NEWS
WIRE, Dec. 5, 1994, 1.
34 See SFE Makes Margin Calls on Contracts, AAP NEWSFEED, Oct. 28, 1997, 2.
35 See Enoch Yiu, Futures Exchange Lifts Margins to Guard Against Sharp Market
Moves, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Sep. 3, 1997, at 1.
36 Id.
37 See Enoch Yiu, Futures Margins Up in Market Dive, SOUTH CHINA MORNING
POST, Oct. 28, 1997, at 2.
38 See Rodney Diola, HKFE Plans to Increase Margin Limit, THE STANDARD, Oct.
31, 1997, 2, available at http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news-detail.asp?ppcat
=&artid=58497&sid=&con type=1 &d str=19971031 &searyear=1997.
39 Automated Lending and Borrowing Mechanism
40 See Stocks - BSE Opens 45.4 pts down, ASIA PULSE, June 18, 2001.
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B. Volatility Effect
The effectiveness of using higher transaction costs to
supplement government intervention and deter double-play
manipulation depends on the absence of any negative impact of
such measures on volatility, price, and volume. Although a
number of papers have examined the volatility impact of imposing
higher transaction costs, their studies have not focused on markets
in times of financial crisis or in substantial downturns.42
In the analysis of the volatility effect of our sample events, we
use daily In(high price) - In(low price) as a proxy for volatility.
Where the daily high or low prices are not available, we use the
"Modified Levine Statistics" as substitute.43 We define Event Day
as the day on which an increase in transaction costs first becomes
effective. Our method is to compare the pre-event volatility with
the volatility on the Event Day and during the period shortly after
41 See Stocks - BSE Closes 19.83 Points Down, ASIAPULSE, June 18, 2001.
42 David A. Hsieh & Merton H. Miller, Margin Regulation and Stock Market
Volatility, 45 J. OF FIN. 3, 3-90 (1990). The authors used daily data to test for signs of
short-term or impact relations between twenty-two historical changes in margin
requirements and the immediately subsequent changes in volatility. They found an
absence of strong and consistent impact effects of margins changes on volatility. See
also Steven R. Umlauf, Transaction Taxes and the Behavior of the Swedish Stock
Market, 33 J. OF FIN. ECON. 227, 227-40 (1993). The author used the Swedish stock
market data from the 1980s and showed that the introduction of, or an increase in
Swedish tax, led to an increase in volatility of stock prices. See also Charles M. Jones &
Paul J. Seguin, Transaction Costs and Price Volatility: Evidence from Commission
Deregulation, 87 AM. ECON. REv. 728, 728-37 (1997). The paper has shown that the
reduction in the commission portion of the transaction costs in 1975 led to a decrease in
the volatility of stock prices and an increase in trading volume. See also Ian Domowitz,
Jack Glen & Ananth Madhavan, Liquidity, Volatility and Equity Trading Costs Across
Countries and Over Time, 4 INT'L FIN. 221, 221-55 (2001). The paper analyzed data of
the average trading costs as a percentage of trade value for active portfolio managers in
forty-two countries and found that transaction costs do not have a significant impact on
the standard deviations of returns.
43 See Howard Levene, Robust Tests for Equality of Variances, in CONTRIBUTIONS
TO PROBABILITY AND STATISTIcs 278, 278-80 (Ingram Olkin ed., 1960). Suppose there
are G groups of data, indexed i - 1, 2, 3 ... G. Each group contains n observations. Let
2 .th 2 2 !V0-i be the variance of the I group. The null hypothesis is 71  2 . Let X be
the j observation in the i't group. The Levine Statistic is computed as follows:
W =[n(z, - )2 /(G- 1)] /-- (z -Z. i ) 2 / (n -1), where
z= - , = > xn .
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the Event Day. Specifically, we bootstrap the distribution for the
pre-Event average volatility from observations for the five-day
period prior to the Event Day. We then examine the standings of
the Event Day volatility and the average volatility for the five
post-Event Days in this distribution. In addition, we use the
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test44 to compare the volatility levels for the
five-day period before and the five-day period after the Event Day.
We pay attention to events in which both the Event Day volatility
and the post-Event average volatility were significantly lower than
the pre-Event volatility. Lower Event Day volatility but higher or
unchanged post-Event average volatility indicates that any
declination in volatility is transitory and unlikely to continue
beyond the Event Day or shortly thereafter. Lower post-Event
average volatility but higher or unchanged Event Day volatility
indicates that the declination in post-Event volatility is likely
caused by factors other than the increase in transaction cost.
Table 1 reports the average volatility before and after the Event
Day as well as the volatility on the Event Day. Among the eight
events included in our study, only Event #2 (the imposition of a
0.2% sales tax on stocks traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange on
January 2, 1995) shows a volatility decline on both the Event Day
and the five-day period after the Event Day. Events #5 and #7
(Hong Kong's imposition of a higher initial margin on Hang Seng
Index Futures on September 4 and November 4, 2007,
respectively) have lower post-Event average volatility. However,
the volatility on the Event Day is actually higher or unchanged.
Table 1
Volatility Before and After Imposition of Higher Transaction Cost
This table reports, for the relevant index futures contract or the stock market index,
daily volatility on the Event Day, the average daily volatility during the 5-day period
prior to the Event Day, and the average daily volatility during the 5-day period after
the Event Day. Volatility is proxied by daily ln(high price) - ln(low price). Where
daily high and low prices are unavailable, daily volatility is calculated by using the
Modified Levene Statistics described in Footnote 45.
44 See generally David Anderson et al., INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICS 406, 406-10
(Bradley Schiller ed., West Publishing Co. 1981) (describing the "Wilcoxon Rank Sum
Test").
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Pre-Event Event Post-EventAverage Day Average
0.01 0.02 0.021 Japan, January 31, 1991, initial margins
on Nikkei 225 Futures was raised from
15% to 20%.
2 Poland, January 2, 1995, 0.2% tax on
sales of stocks on Warsaw Stock
Exchange
3 Australia, October 24, 1997, SFE raised
initial margin on All Ordinary Index
Futures from A$2,500 to A$3,000.
4 Hong Kong, August 21, 1997, HangSeng
Index Futures initial margin was
increased from HK$50,000 to
HK$55,000
5 Hong Kong, September 4, 1997,
HangSeng Index Futures initial margin
was increased from HK$55,000 to
HK$60,000
6 Hong Kong, October 24, 1997,
HangSeng Index Futures initial margin
was increased from HK$70,000 to
HK$75,000.
7 Hong Kong, November 4, 1997,
HangSeng Index Futures initial margin
was increased from HK$75,000 to
HK$90,000.
8 India, June 18, 2001, National Stock
Exchange increased margins on the
ALBM session from 17.5% to 40%.
Table 2 reports the standing of the Event Day volatility and the
post-Event average volatility in the bootstrapped distribution of the
pre-Event average volatility. If the imposition of a higher
transaction cost results in lower volatility, we should see that the
Event Day volatility and the post-Event average volatility stand
within 5% or 10% of the distribution on the lower end. This
occurs only in Event #2. For Event #7, although the post-Event
average volatility is significantly lower than the pre-Event
volatility at the 5% significance level (with a distribution standing
of 0%), the Event Day volatility has a distribution standing at
44%, suggesting the insignificance of its difference from the pre-
Event level. These results are confirmed by the Wilcoxon Rank
Sum Test results listed in Table 2. In sum, the above evidence
strongly suggests that an increase in transaction costs does not lead
to volatility declines in markets that are going through major
corrections.
0.02 0.03
0.02 0.02
0.07 0.11
0.09 0.09
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Table 2
The Volatility Effect of Increasing Transaction Cost in Bear Markets
This table reports the standing of the Event Day volatility and post-Event average
daily volatility in the distribution bootstrapped from the daily volatilties in the 5-day
period prior to the Event Day. The table also reports the result of the Wilcoxon Rank
Sum Test used to compare the daily volatilities 5 days before and 5 days after the
Event Day. Significant lower post-event volatility is noted.
Wilcoxon
Distribution Percentile Rank Sum
Event Day Post-Event
Event
I Japan, January 31, 1991,
initial margins on Nikkei
225 Futures was raised
from 15% to 20%.
2 Poland, January 2, 1995,
0.2% tax on sales of stocks
on Warsaw Stock
Exchange.
3 Australia, October 24,
1997, SFE raised initial
margin on All Ordinary
Index Futures from
A$2,500 to A$3,000.
4 Hong Kong, August 21,
1997, HangSeng Index
Futures initial margin was
increased from HK$50,000
to HK$55,000.
5 Hong Kong, September 4,
1997, HangSeng Index
Futures initial margin was
increased from HK$55,000
to HK$60,000.
6 Hong Kong, October 24,
1997, HangSeng Index
Futures initial margin was
increased from HK$70,000
to HK$75,000.
7 Hong Kong, November 4,
1997, HangSeng Index
Futures initial margin was
increased from HK$75,000
to HK$90,000.
8 India, June 18, 2001,
National Stock Exchange
increased margins on the
ALBM session from 17.5%
Volatility Volatility p Value
100% 100% 0.01
100%
99%
31%
99%
100%
61%
19%
94%
44%
100% 94%
0.03**
0.01
0.5
0.42
0.1
0.07*
0.15
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to 40%.
** Significantly lower at 5%
level.
* Significantly lower at 10%
level.
C. Price Effect
Existing research on the price effect of an increase in
transaction costs has drawn mixed conclusions. Barclay, Kandel
and Marx have found that the changes in the "bid-ask spread" (a
proxy for transaction costs) do not have any significant impact on
stocks' returns.45 However, Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan have
found that transaction costs have a negative impact on the annual
returns of stocks traded in some countries.46 Again, these studies
have not focused on the price effect in financial crisis or
substantial bear markets.
We take a similar approach to our analysis of the volatility
effect discussed in Section l1l(B) above by (1) comparing returns,
defined as the difference in log settlement prices between two
consecutive trading days, of the Event Day with the average daily
returns for the five-day period immediately before the Event Day;
(2) comparing settlement prices on the Event Day with the average
settlement prices for the five-day period immediately before the
Event Day; and (3) comparing the average post-Event settlement
prices with the average pre-Event settlement prices.
45 Michael J. Barclay, Eugene Kandel & Leslie M. Marx, The Effects of
Transaction Costs on Stock Prices and Trading Volume, 7 J. OF FIN. INTERMEDIATION
130, 130-50 (1998).
46 Domowitz et al., supra note 42, at 241-44.
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Table 3
Daily Returns Before and After Imposition of Higher Transaction Cost
This table reports, for the relevant index futures contract or the stock market index,
the daily return on the Event Day, the average daily return for the 5-day period before
the Event Day, and the average daily return for the 5-day period after the Event Day.
Daily return is defined as In(close price for the day) - In(close price for the previous
day).
Pre-Event Event Post-EventAverage Day Average
I Japan, January 31, 1991, initial
margins on Nikkei 225 Futures
was raised from 15% to 20%.
2 Poland, January 2, 1995, 0.2%
tax on sales of stocks on Warsaw
Stock Exchange.
3 Australia, October 24, 1997,
SFE raised initial margin on All
Ordinary Index Futures from
A$2,500 to A$3,000.
4 Hong Kong, August 21, 1997,
HangSeng Index Futures initial
margin was increased from
HK$50,000 to HK$55,000.
5 Hong Kong, September 4, 1997,
HangSeng Index Futures initial
margin was increased from
HK$55,000 to HK$60,000.
6 Hong Kong, October 24, 1997,
HangSeng Index Futures initial
margin was increased from
HK$70,000 to HK$75,000.
7 Hong Kong, November 4, 1997,
HangSeng Index Futures initial
margin was increased from
HK$75,000 to HK$90,000.
8 India, June 18, 2001, National
Stock Exchange increased
margins on the ALBM session
from 17.5% to 40%.
0.003 -0.010 0.003
0.0001
0.002
-0.007
-0.008
-0.051
0.022
-0.007
0.026
-0.032
-0.016
-0.040
0.059
-0.062
-0.006
0.0005
-0.015
-0.006
-0.001
-0.010
-0.028
0.001
Table 3 reports the average daily returns before and after the
Event Day as well as the daily return on the Event Day. Events #3,
#5 and #7 have both a lower Event Day return and a lower average
post-Event return, while Events #1 and #4 have a lower Event Day
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return but a higher or unchanged post-Event return. Table 4
reports the average settlement prices before and after the Event
Day as well as the settlement price on the Event Day. Events #1,
#3, #4, #6 and #8 all have lower Event Day settlement prices and
post-Event average settlement prices, although the differences
from the pre-Event level in Events #1 and #3 appear nominal.
Table 4
Settlement Price Before and After Imposition of Higher Transaction Cost
This table reports, for the relevant index futures contract or the stock market index,
the settlement price on the Event Day, the average settement price for the 5-day
period before the Event Day and the average settlement price for the 5-day period
after the Event Day.
Pre-Event Event Post-EventAverage Day Average
1 Japan, January 31, 1991, initial
margins on Nikkei 225 Futures
was raised from 15% to 20%.
2 Poland, January 2, 1995, 0.2%
tax on sales of stocks on
Warsaw Stock Exchange.
3 Australia, October 24, 1997,
SFE raised initial margin on All
Ordinary Index Futures from
A$2,500 to A$3,000.
4 Hong Kong, August 21, 1997,
HangSeng Index Futures initial
margin was increased from
HK$50,000 to HK$55,000.
5 Hong Kong, September 4,
1997, HangSeng Index Futures
initial margin was increased
from HK$55,000 to
HK$60,000.
6 Hong Kong, October 24, 1997,
HangSeng Index Futures initial
margin was increased from
HK$70,000 to HK$75,000.
7 Hong Kong, November 4,
1997, HangSeng Index Futures
initial margin was increased
from HK$75,000 to
HK$90,000.
8 India, June 18, 2001, National
Stock Exchange increased
margins on the ALBM session
23,824 23,570 23,808
36
2,651
16,000
14,159
12,198
10,352
3,467
37
2,594
15,725
14,300
11,240
10,710
3,353
38
2,492
15,576
14,782
10,248
10,368
3,392
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from 17.5% to 40%.
Whether or not the differences from the pre-Event level are
statistically significant is reported in Table 5. At the 10%
significance level, only Event #3 has a significantly lower return
and settlement price on the Event Day as well as for the five-day
period after the Event Day. This is evidenced by the low standings
of the Event Day and post-Event numbers in the distribution of the
pre-Event average returns and settlement prices (1%, 0% and 1%
for the Event Day return, settlement price and post-Event average
settlement price, respectively). Event #8 has a significantly lower
Event Day settlement price and average post-settlement price, but
its Event Day return is indifferent from the pre-Event average.
This suggests that the lower Event Day and post-Event settlement
price are likely due to a temporary declining time trend in
settlement prices rather than the increase in transaction costs, since
any significant impact of the higher cost would have been
reflected in the Event Day return. Events #1, #5 and #7 have
significantly low Event Day returns, but their post-Event average
settlement prices are statistically indifferent from the pre-Event
averages, suggesting that any price impact of an increase in
transaction costs does not last beyond the first day of its
imposition. Events #4 and #6 have significantly lower post-Event
average settlement prices but higher or unchanged Event Day
returns and settlement prices. This suggests that the lower post-
Event average price is unrelated to the increase in transaction
costs, whose impact, if any, is expected to be more prominent on
the first day of its imposition. In sum, there is no compelling
evidence to suggest that an increase in transaction costs in a
substantial bear market has any long-lasting negative price impact.
Table 5
The Price Effect of Increasing Transaction Cost in Bear Markets
This table reports (1) the standing of the Event Day return in the distribution
bootstrapped from the daily returns in the 5-day period prior to the Event Day, (2) the
standing of the Event Day settlement price in the distribution bootstrapped from the
settlement prices in the 5-day period prior to the Event Day, (3) the standing of the
post-event average settlement prices in the distribution bootstrapped from settlement
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prices for the 5-day period prior to the Event Day, and (4) the result of the Wilcoxon
Rank Sum Test used to compare the settlement prices 5 days before and 5 days after
the Event Day. Significant lower Event Day and post-Event return and settlement price
are noted.
Wilcoxon
Distribution Percentile Rank Sum
Event- Event-
Day Day Post-Event
Event Return Price Average Price p Value
1 Japan, January 31, 0%** 0%** 26% 0.34
1991, initial margins
on Nikkei 225
Futures was raised
from 15% to 20%.
2 Poland, January 2,
1995, 0.2% tax on
sales of stocks on
Warsaw Stock
Exchange.
3 Australia, October
24, 1997, SFE raised
initial margin on All
Ordinary Index
Futures from
A$2,500 to A$3,000.
4 Hong Kong, August
21, 1997, HangSeng
Index Futures initial
margin was
increased from
HK$50,000 to
HK$55,000.
5 Hong Kong,
September 4, 1997,
HangSeng Index
Futures initial
margin was
increased from
HK$55,000 to
HK$60,000.
6 Hong Kong, October
24, 1997, HangSeng
Index Futures initial
margin was
increased from
HK$70,000 to
HK$75,000.
7 Hong Kong,
November 4, 1997,
HangSeng Index
Futures initial
100% 100% 100%
1%** 0%**
20%
9%*
100%
0.01**
0.02**
0.07
0.02**
0.34
2% 0%**
77%
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margin was
increased from
HK$75,000 to
HK$90,000.
8 India, June 18, 2001, 58% 0%** 0%** 0.05**
National Stock
Exchange increased
margins on the
ALBM session from
17.5% to 40%.
** Significantly lower at
5% level.
* Significantly lower at
10% level.
D. Volume Effect
The effectiveness of using higher transaction costs to support
government intervention and deter double-play manipulation
depends on the absence of any negative impact of such higher
costs on trading volume. Barclay, Kandel and Marx use the "bid-
ask spread" as proxy for transaction costs and show that changes
in the spread are negatively correlated with trading volume for
NYSE and NASDAQ stocks.47 Jones and Seguin have found that
a reduction in the transaction costs leads to an increase in trading
volume.48 However, none of the existing studies focus on the
volume effect of imposing higher transaction costs when the
market is subject to persistent downward pressures. In addition,
the results of these studies also appear inconsistent with the
prevailing views of market participants.49
In this paper, we examine the volume effect by (1) comparing
the absolute trading volume on the Event Day with the average
volume for the five-day period immediately before the Event Day;
(2) comparing the daily percentage change in trading volume,
defined as the percentage difference in the trading volumes
between two consecutive trading days, on the Event Day with the
47 Barclay et al., supra note 45, at 132.
48 Jones & Seguin, supra note 42.
49 For example, Steve Chan, the Chief Operating Officer of the Hong Kong Futures
Exchange, said in response to the question of whether increasing the initial margin on
Hang Seng Index Future would cause reduction in trading volume: "We have recorded
more turnover since we raised the margin in August [1997]. I believe turnover is related
to investors' need for hedging and not to the margin level. Futures exchange lifts
margins to guard against sharp market moves." Yiu, supra note 37.
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average daily percentage change in the trading volume for the
five-day period immediately before the Event Day; and (3)
comparing the average post-Event daily trading volume with the
pre-Event average daily trading volume. A conclusion that higher
transaction costs lead to a lower trading volume that is non-
transitory in nature should be supported by consistent evidence in
all of the above measures.
Table 6 reports the absolute trading volume on the Event Day
and the average volume before and after the Event Day. Only two
Event Days, #5 and #7, show a reduced trading volume for both
the Event Day and the post-Event period.
Table 6
Daily Trading Volume Before and After
Imposition of Higher Transaction Cost
This table reports, for the relevant index futures contract or the stock market index, the
trading volume on the Event Day, the average daily trading volume for the 5-day period
before the Event Day and the average daily trading volume for the 5-day period after the
Event Day.
Pre-Event Post-EventEvent Averag Event Day Average
I Japan, January 31, 1991, initial
margins on Nikkei 225 Futures was
raised from 15% to 20%.
2 Poland, January 2, 1995, 0.2% tax
on sales of stocks on Warsaw Stock
Exchange.
3 Australia, October 24, 1997, SFE
raised initial margin on All Ordinary
Index Futures from A$2,500 to
A$3,000.
4 Hong Kong, August 21, 1997,
HangSeng Index Futures initial
margin was increased from
HK$50,000 to HK$55,000.
5 Hong Kong, September 4, 1997,
HangSeng Index Futures initial
margin was increased from
HK$55,000 to HK$60,000.
6 Hong Kong, October 24, 1997,
HangSeng Index Futures initial
margin was increased from
HK$70,000 to HK$75,000.
60,349 56,733 70,805
911 2,053
31,650
40,317
53,290
41,188
32,803
54,817
570
1,984
39,884
26,480
54,227
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7 Hong Kong, November 4, 1997, 45,608 32,251 28,911
HangSeng Index Futures initial
margin was increased from
HK$75,000 to HK$90,000.
8 India, June 18, 2001, National Stock 20,588,716 21,516,460 20,042,796
Exchange increased margins on the
ALBM session from 17.5% to 40%.
Table 7 reports the daily percentage change in trading volume
on the Event Day and the average percentage change before and
after the Event Day. Although six out of eight events show a
lower value for this measure on the Event Day relative to the pre-
Event average, the difference is statistically significant at a 10%
level in only three out of eight events, as shown in Table 8. Even
among the three events that tested significantly, only Event #5
shows notably lower trading volume in all three measures of
change (i.e., Event Day percentage change in trading volume
relative to the pre-Event average, Event Day trading volume
relative to the pre-Event average, and post-Event average trading
volume relative to the pre-Event average). In Event #6, although
the percentage change in trading volume on the Event Day is
significantly lower, absolute trading volume is actually higher than
the pre-Event average. This is also the case with Event #8. For
Event #7, although the Event Day absolute trading volume and the
post-Event average show significant declines from the pre-Event
level, the Event Day percentage change is actually significantly
higher than the pre-Event level. Thus, any reduction in the
absolute trading volume on the Event Day, as well as during the
post-Event period, is likely due to the existence of a temporary
declining time trend in trading volume rather than the imposition
of a higher transaction cost.
Table 7
Percentage Change in Daily Trading Volume Before and After Imposition of
Higher Transaction Cost
This table reports, for the relevant index futures contract or the stock market index,
the daily percentage change in trading volume on the Event Day, the average daily
percentage change in trading volume for the 5-day period before the Event Day, and
the average daily percentage change in trading volume for the 5-day period after the
Event Day. Daily percentage change in trading volume is defined as (daily trading
volume - daily trading volume on the previous day)/daily trading volume on the
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previous day.
Event Pre-Event Event Post-EventAverage Day Average
-0.6% -3.8% 10.2%I Japan, January 31, 1991,
initial margins on Nikkei 225
Futures was raised from 15%
to 20%.
2 Poland, January 2, 1995,
0.2% tax on sales of stocks
on Warsaw Stock Exchange
3 Australia, October 24, 1997,
SFE raised initial margin on
All Ordinary Index Futures
from A$2,500 to A$3,000.
4 Hong Kong, August 21,
1997, HangSeng Index
Futures initial margin was
increased from HK$50,000
to HK$55,000.
5 Hong Kong, September 4,
1997, HangSeng Index
Futures initial margin was
increased from HK$55,000
to HK$60,000.
6 Hong Kong, October 24,
1997, HangSeng Index
Futures initial margin was
increased from HK$70,000
to HK$75,000.
7 Hong Kong, November 4,
1997, HangSeng Index
Futures initial margin was
increased from HK$75,000
to HK$90,000.
8 India, June 18, 2001,
National Stock Exchange
increased margins on the
ALBM session from 17.5%
to 40%.
-12.6%
194.1%
7.3%
-25.8%
-34.3%
23.6%
-10.9%
-3.8%
37.6%
1.5%
-11.5%
-9.2%
2.5%
-2.2%
Table 8
The Volume Effect of Increasing Transaction Cost in Bear Markets
This table reports (1) the standing of the Event Day percentage change in trading
volume in the distribution bootstrapped from the daily percentage change in trading
volume in the 5-day period prior to the Event Day, (2) the standing of the Event Day
trading volume in the distribution bootstrapped from the daily trading volume in the
5-day period prior to the Event Day, (3) the standing of the post-event average daily
12.1%
10.5%
14.6%
4.2%
23.9%
-5.2%
-0.1%
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trading volume in the distribution bootstrapped from the daily trading volume for the
5-day period prior to the Event Day, and (4) the result of the Wilcoxon Rank Sum
Test used to compare the daily trading volumes 5 days before and 5 days after the
Event Day. Significant lower Event Day and post-Event daily trading volume and
lower Event Day percentage in trading volume are noted.
Wilcoxon
Distribution Percentile Rank Sum
Event-Day Event-Day Post-Event
Volume Change Volume Average Volume p Value
29% 12% 100% 0.07
19%
100%
26%
97%
100%
99%
99%
100%
98%
Event
I Japan, January
31, 1991, initial
margins on
Nikkei 225
Futures was
raised from 15%
to 20%.
2 Poland, January
2, 1995, 0.2% tax
on sales of stocks
on Warsaw Stock
Exchange.
3 Australia,
October 24, 1997,
SFE raised initial
margin on All
Ordinary Index
Futures from
A$2,500 to
A$3,000.
4 Hong Kong,
August 21, 1997,
HangSeng Index
Futures initial
margin was
increased from
HK$50,000 to
HK$55,000.
5 Hong Kong,
September 4,
1997, HangSeng
Index Futures
initial margin was
increased from
HK$55,000 to
HK$60,000.
6 Hong Kong,
October 24, 1997,
HangSeng Index
Futures initial
margin was
increased from
HK$70,000 to
HK$75,000.
7 Hong Kong,
November 4,
1997, HangSeng
Index Futures
initial margin was
97%
0.11
0.01
0.11
0.01**
0.42
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increased from
HK$75,000 to
HK$90,000.
8 India, June 18, 8%* 82% 29% 0.5
2001, National
Stock Exchange
increased margins
on the ALBM
session from
17.5% to 40%.
** Significantly lower
at 5% level.
* Significantly lower
at 10% level.
In sum, only one out of eight events shows a significantly
lower Event Day percentage change in trading volume, the Event
Day absolute trading volume and post-Event average trading
volume. This result is inconsistent with the hypothesis that
increasing transaction costs has the tendency to reduce trading
volume.
IV. Conclusion
This paper proposes a solution to the dilemma that financial
market regulators in developing economies face when their
currency board system is subject to attacks by the so-called
double-play manipulation strategy typically implemented at times
of financial crisis. Interventions in equity markets may be
required to break the self-fulfilling prophecy of the double-play
manipulation, but the intervention demands an enormous capital
resource that is typically beyond the budgetary limit and financial
means of most governments in developing economies. We believe
the solution lies in raising transaction costs on short sellers and
supplementing the intervention with the revenue generated by such
additional levy. Such a measure can only claim to be effective if it
results in the alleviation of short pressures in the currency and/or
stock markets. We set up a portfolio choice problem from the
perspective of a double-play manipulator and examined how his
optimal choice for short positions in both markets changes when
facing such a regulatory measure. We find that the manipulator
will be prompted to reduce his short positions in both the currency
and the equity markets if the higher transaction costs do not lower
volatility, reduce trading volume, and plunge the price. Our
empirical study of eight historical events of regulators increasing
transaction costs at times of financial crisis or substantial price
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corrections suggests that these market conditions do not typically
follow the imposition of higher costs. Our study has shown the
viability of using higher transaction costs as a regulatory tool in
combating double-play manipulations that exacerbate the pain
suffered by developing economies going through difficult
corrections. How such a tool is best implemented in different
markets naturally depends on the geopolitical and economic
environment of each individual country. A currency board system
that is essential for the political and economic stability of
developing economies has been, and will continue to be, a
lucrative prey for financial sharks eyeing a long line of currency
and stock market kills when a temporary dislocation exists
between the pegged currencies. It is imperative for regulators to
establish defense plans in preparation for future double-play
attacks. We hope our study helps in this regard.
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Appendix A: Derivation of Key Formulas
1. g, = vl, (T) , where g, = the number of futures
20 -
contracts that the government buys during the period of t to
t+J, vl, (r) = trading volume (i.e., number of contracts traded)
during the period t to t+l, not including the volume generated
by the government's intervention. To see this:
Step 1 - Assumptions
We assume that the government is exempt from the initial
margin requirement and other transaction costs but its
positions are marked-to-market at the end of each period.
Relaxation of this assumption does not change the results of
our analysis because (1) initial margin deposits are
insubstantial as they are merely opportunity costs of capital -
the costs being the difference in interest accrued to margins
deposited with the exchange and the returns that otherwise
could be earned had they not been deposited with the futures
exchange; and (2) the transaction costs, mainly in forms of
stamp duties and exchange fees, etc., constitute a small
percentage of the value of a trade.
Step 2
Let V = dollar (in local currency) value per index point.
The transaction fees paid by the short positions executed at
the index price level Pi are equal to vlp, (r)PVr%. Since
there is no upfront cost for the government to long positions
in index futures, the government can use all revenues
collected for payment of its marked-to-market obligations if
the index futures price further declines. Let N, be the number
of long contracts that the government can hold at the price
level P with the transaction fee levies. Under the assumption
that the government loses an average 20% on its long
positions at t+1, the government's marked-to-market
obligation for each long contract is 20%PiV.
vl, (r)PjVr% vi, (r)r%
20%PV 0.2
Step 3
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Given the imbalance between short and long orders at
times of crisis, we assume that the government's long orders
are matched immediately with short orders. Short positions
provide the government with revenues in the form of
transaction fees against which the government is able to hold
vl (r)r%2
additional N 2 = long contracts at the index price
level P. This process goes on. Thus, at each price level P,
the number of long contracts that the government can hold is
equal to the following under the assumption that
0% < r% < 20%:
1, (*-*% vl ,),%2 Vl (,),%
+ + +
0.2 0.22 0.2
3
vl, (_.)_ % ,.% .% 2  r%
3
0.2 (1 + + + +...)
0.2 0.2 0.
VIP (z.)r.% _ _VIP (z.)r.%
0..% 0.2 - r%
0.2,
Step 4
Adding the government's long positions at each price level
gives:
vl (r-)T% vlz,,(*)% vl,,(r)i%
gt-+ + "
0.2-% 0.2-z-% 0.2-T%
-02-3% [Vl ( -) + V1P (T-) + VIP (-) +..
- vl,(r)=vl,(r)T
0.2 -r-% 20-r
2. The Objective Function and the First Order Conditions
The original objective function is:
[Vol. XXXV
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Max EL-exp(-Ra[(W -S ,FV-%/1 +r,)+(F -F,,)Sf,V-Sr, (, -r,D
OE(x)+ -Ra 80o
2
" E(exo) = e 2
-RaE(Wt+ )+- Ra Var(Wt+|)
. E (e taw 1) -e2
.E(W,+,) = (Wo - Sf,,FVr%X1 + rt)
+ (F - E(F~ ))g f,tv - g$t(t- tS
Var(Wt+,) =Var(Ft+l f 2  2 tS2 V2t: )Sf~V = c f,t+l1_f,tv
whereC + 2, o.+ 1 (=) = Var(F+1 )
In addition,
Max{-e- Ra W ' I= Minte -RaW,, I
= i{e - R aE(Wl*)+Ra 2Var(W,+l)
SMax{ eRaE(W, ) - IRa2Var(W,)}
Thus, the objective function can be written as:
Ra{(W -SfFVr%Xl+r)(F t -E(F,+I))SfjV-Sj (r, -)} Ra
2 S 2 V
2
o2+0
Max e 2 f
85, ,Sf
Let
Ra{(Wo-S f,,tFVr% Xl+rt )( F-E (F +
, 
))S f ,t-S$, t (r-r ,us)}-R R a 2S ft V2", 1L=e 2 -
the first order conditions are given by:
aL 2 F)
-- F - E(F - Fr%(1 + - RaSfIVf,t+ = 0 (1)S f ,t I l
aL E(F,+,)Q
- as s , (2)as, s,
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3. The Implicit Function Theorem and the Gramer's Rule
Taking derivative on both sides of first order conditions with
regard to transaction fee r produces the following
conditions:
0E(F+l) ( laS$,1 O+, Or )+ aE(F>1 )Og, +E(F+I)OOf 1
Ir+ as,, ~+ 2L, -+,+L L_ 
- ( ,0:-- as$" ar aO--r) a g, Or Of Ozr 100
+ Ra V,,+, asf" + R aVSf, fc4.
r ar
aSf,, OE(F,+l) Or,
,  ar,+, [2E(F,+1 ) ('ar+, OS$,, + ar+, aO]
TOr ar,+l as,, f" O , O ,- s,, ar O0 Or
r,, ' 2E(F+I) Og, +Si. , a 2E(F,I) OOf
" f 1+1 __________OS,, Or.,41 g, Or as$, Or,+ OO f Or
OE(F+l) t+ 3, +2r+l aOr
"S ,t  r OS, Or OS$, 0r Otr )
The above can be expressed in a matrix form as follows:
-_RaV 2  OE(F,+,) Or,+, S
,+I, +s, ) -r
Or,+, as__$,, as$,, &;+, r+ as2, -. Oa j
[Vol. XXXV
DETERRING "DOUBLE-PLAY" MANPULATION
OE(F+,) ar,, OOr OE(F,+,) aOf +E(F,+,) Og,
art 00 r a 00z  0  O13 Fag, Or
1 aaf-fl+
+ 100 F(I+r,)+RaVSf,t icr = A
Or,+, a O2E(F,,) Or,+, 00 r + 2E(F+,) a01
Sf,t c r 0 O rr Oa z Of O r
OE(F,+,) O2r+, 00, Or,+, a2E(F+,) Og,+ Sf,1 - -+ Sf,l
Or,+, )SstaoQ Or OS$,, Or+Og, Or
Let
M=-
Ra 2  aE(F+l) ar,+,2Ra f.+ 1 r+l a $
Or,- O S f 2' as o,,r,+ 1  o5S2
ar,, ssl ssl r,+ $S$t
The above system of equations can be solved by using the
Gramer's Rule:
A M 1 2
asf'l - M22 AM22-BM 12 (3)
Or detIMI detIMI
Mil A
OS$,t M 21 B BMl - AM21 (4)
Or detIMI detIMI
4. Proof that the signs of aS, and OS-'" depend on the signs of
A and B. Or Or
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The elements of matrix M are second order derivatives of the
objective function with regard to St and Ss,, . To see this:
aL V(F E(F,,)) 
- F, Vr%(I + r,) RaSfVo
•,* . .
 f , 1~rf,+1
a 2 L aE(Ft+l) RaVo -- RaVor2
asy2 V asf Ra ft+I -Ra j1+..os --7=v(,,
because (Ft) - 0 by assumption
OSf,,
aL - aE(F +,) r (
aSs,, -f r,+, ass,
2 a + rE(F,+,) 2r+
LS, E(Ft+l)(arI 2 5  aE(~~1)a2 "Ias2- SV ar2  ass +I ) ~ as2
$ ~ CIas, a(E+)
a2L aE(,+ 1) a - (s v ar a0L = -V. =E(t+ )  tr+, .
ass,, asf, ar+, ass,,  as ,,
*." By assumption,
E(F,+.) = E[f(r,+, (S,, (0) r () t (), Of()
aE(F+,) a r,,
.and are not functions of Sf*,.
ar,+l tass,t
a( aE(F,+,)j
Therefore, " r, = 0 and
asf,,
02 L E(F,+,) ar,
as$,,osf, &+l Cos$,t
By second order necessary conditions,
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M 22 < 0 and Ml 1 0
M 1 *M22 -M 12 *M2 =detl O0
By well-recognized financial market experience, attacks on
the local currency lead to higher local currency interest
rate, thus
->0.
as$,t
By well-recognized financial market experience, an
increase in local currency interest rate leads to lower local
stock prices, thus
aE(F, 0)
<0.
aE(F,, ) ar,,, 0Thus, M12 = M21 
as$"0
ar OS as I
Thus, if A > 0 and B > 0, j- < 0 and " <0.
Or Or
2009]
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